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COMMENT
TO CAESAR WHAT IS CAESAR’S: AN AUDACIOUS CLAIM
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGE REFORM IN PATENT LAW
Justin A. Reddington†
I. INTRODUCTION
Fueled by advances in the fields of computer technology, pharmacology,
and mechanical engineering, the United States has experienced a ‘‘patent
explosion’’ over the last thirty years.1 As defensive patenting, patenting for
litigation, and patents for cross licenses are becoming the norm,2 the
volume of litigation in patent claims has doubled in the last two decades.3 In
response to this rise in litigation, Congress initiated legislative reform in an
attempt to curb litigation trends, without significant success.4 But these
patent claims cannot be considered in a vacuum. At their heart, patent
claims are no more than tort claims enforced through federal statutory
protection. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider tort reform measures
when seeking solutions to prevent excessive patent litigation.
In general, tort reform-----particularly in the area of damages-----has
sparked much legal debate by academics, judges, and legislators in the last
half century.5 Frequent large punitive damages awards, increased frequency
of punitive damages in general, and the constant enticement of a potential
punitive windfall have caused growing concern in the legal community
about the structure and application of punitive damage awards.6 This
† Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW; J.D. Candidate, Liberty University
School of Law, May 2016; B.S., Washington State University; Honorary Velocieraptor
Mongoliensis.
1. Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent Explosion 1, 4-5, 17, 19 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10605, 2004).
2. Id. at 3, 4, 9.
3. See Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4-5), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570803. While not a violent ‘‘explosion,’’ the number of patent law
cases has been steadily and significantly increasing, doubling in the 16 years between 1994
and 2010. Id. (manuscript at 16).
4. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 18) (describing the 2011 America Invents Act, which----rather than curbing litigation trends-----resulted in a surge of new patent infringement
claims).
5. See Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive
Damage Reform, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1573, 1574 (1997).
6. Id.
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Comment offers a possible alternative to the continued and non-productive
grant of punitive damages as a plaintiff’s windfall. But that is not to say that
punitive damages themselves are improper. It is clear that punitive damages
are, and will always be, an important part of civil litigation.7 They impose
additional punishment on intentional, willful, and wanton tortfeasors by
making an example of them to the public, and by providing sufficient,
quasi-criminal punishment to deter the offender from committing the
offense in the future. What is unclear-----and what has been increasingly
questioned of late8-----is whether plaintiffs should be granted those awards.
The damages are levied for the purpose of reforming or deterring an
offender, and are only so imposed in cases where the offender’s conduct
merits their use. Technically, the plaintiff is already made whole by a
compensatory damages award. Should the plaintiff be awarded a windfall?
Would that windfall serve as a significant incentive to other potential
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) to bring causes of action that they would not
otherwise undertake? Can the damages be given to a more deserving entity
and still serve the interests of justice?
This Comment seeks to answer these questions, and to show that a splitrecovery system for punitive damages-----if adopted by the Federal Patent
Code-----would be best suited to serve the interests of justice in patent claims
and to help allay the disturbing upward trend in punitive damage awards in
American courts.9
Part II will provide the background of punitive damages as a whole; the
history of compensatory damages in general and in patent law; and the
history of punitive damages in general and in patent law. Part II will also
demonstrate that punitive damages are by their very nature special damages
and historically have been used infrequently-----and then only in cases of
extreme or wanton misconduct. Further, Part II will discuss how in the last
half-century, these damages have been used with significantly increased
frequency, both in tort law generally and in patent law specifically. Finally,
the section will outline the need for reform in patent law damages.
Part III will take a focused look at the need for reform both in punitive
damages in general, and in patent law punitive damages in particular. It

7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500-01 (1993) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (‘‘As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were ‘‘rarely assessed’’ and
usually ‘‘small in amount.’’ Recently, however, the frequency and size of such awards have
been skyrocketing. One commentator has observed that ‘‘hardly a month goes by without a
multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a product liability case.’’ And it appears that
the upward trajectory continues unabated.’’ (internal citations omitted)).
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will examine the split-recovery system, implemented by six states and
several countries as part of the tort reform movement, and argue that such a
system should be implemented in the exclusively federal world of patent
law.
Part IV will examine the difficulties and concerns with implementing a
split-recovery system in patent law punitive damages and seek to allay those
fears. This Comment will show that proper application of split-recovery,
while certainly a legal measure that is sure to offend the plaintiff’s bar, will
best serve the interests of justice and judicial economy in the federal courts.
Part V will recommend the application of a split-recovery system to 35
U.S.C. § 284, and will suggest several possible destinations for recovered
funds.
II. BACKGROUND
Since the earliest days of American jurisprudence, punitive damages have
been a source of great debate between judges, legislators, lawyers, and
American citizens.10 While these damages do serve a vital role in deterring
wrongdoing, they can also serve as a powerful incentive for creative
plaintiffs-----and creative plaintiffs’ lawyers-----to invent and pursue claims
with potentially high damages awards. The debate over punitive damages,
and tort reform in general, is one that has consumed a great deal of thought,
printed text, and scholarly study.11 Some states, concerned that punitive
damages create the potential for unjust windfalls for prospective plaintiffs,
have imposed split-recovery systems in which punitive damage awards are
split between the plaintiff and some entity of the state.12 This Comment will
demonstrate that the characteristics of patent law13 make patent
infringements uniquely social in harm. As such, it is fitting to take punitive
damages and use them for the benefit of society, instead of allowing them to
serve as a windfall for already-compensated plaintiffs.

10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and
Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 371 (noting that in the face of ‘‘routine’’ punitive damage
awards, commentators and courts have created a number of measures to reform damage
awards).
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. Namely, that (1) patent law is exclusively a creature of federal statute, (2) that patent
protection provides for both social harm and social utility, and (3) that patent statutes both
create and enforce a property right at the expense of social advancement.
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A. Patent Law: A Brief History and Overview
The Copyright Clause, found in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the power ‘‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . .
. .’’14 In short, the clause gives Congress the power to distribute and regulate
copyrights15 and patents,16 a power that Congress has exercised since the
founding of this nation. This section will focus on Congress’s patent
legislation and activity throughout American history, as well as judicial
interpretations of patent statutes.
The Patent Statute of 1790 was the first patent statute passed by the
United States Government.17 It created a national patent system using an
examination structure, which required that at least two members of a threemember panel (comprised of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State,
and the Attorney General) approve all patent applications and determine
whether the work was ‘‘sufficiently useful and important to cause letters
patent to be made out in the name of the United States . . . .’’18 Needless to
say, this system was not designed for a large volume of patent claims.
During the three-year period that the 1790 Patent Statutes existed, the
committee issued approximately fifty patents.19 Commentators suggest that
this figure was likely considerably less than the demand for patents at the
time, which prompted the swift legislative change.20 It is unsurprising, then,
that Congress amended the Code in 1793, in part to accommodate a larger
volume of claims.21
The 1793 Act introduced the practice of the federal patent claim, which
required that each applicant provide a written description ‘‘in such full,
clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before
known, and to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make, compound,
and use the same.’’22 Early patent infringement cases began to apply a

14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
15. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2012) (the modern day copyright statute).
16. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012) (the modern day patent statute).
17. Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the
Development of American Patent Law: 1790-1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 149 (2011).
18. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (Apr. 10, 1790) (under this act, patents
were only valid for a term not exceeding fourteen years).
19. Morriss & Nard, supra note 17, at 150.
20. Id. at 151.
21. See id. at 150.
22. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (Feb. 21, 1793); see Morriss & Nard, supra
note 17, at 151.
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‘‘substantial identity’’ test for infringement.23 Furthermore, in the Patent Act
of 1793, all patent infringement damages were required to be enhanced at
least threefold.24
Between 1793 and 1922, Congress continued to amend the Patent Act.25
Among the notable changes were: the reissue practice in the 1832 Act;26 the
expansion of the Patent Office in the 1836 Act;27 the re-institution of the
examination system in the 1836 Act;28 the common law requirement of
‘‘more ingenuity and skill’’ than the ordinary mechanic;29 and the judicially
imposed doctrine of non-literal infringement from Winans v. Denmead.30
Today, patent law is governed by Title 35 of the United States Code (the
‘‘Modern Patent Act’’) and approximately two hundred years of case law.31
The statute outlines the functions of the patent office and its employees,32
patent applications,33 patentable inventions and patentability
requirements,34 patent protection and remedies,35 and the patent
cooperation treaty.36 The modern patent system continues to grant patents
based on an examination system-----albeit with more robust infrastructure
than the original three member board in 1790.37 Each year, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office grants approximately 300,000 patents,38 and
approximately 6,000 patent infringement claims are filed in federal court.39

23. See Morriss & Nard, supra note 17, at 152.
24. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5.
25. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1832, 4 Stat. 577 (1832); Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836);
Patent Act of 1842, 5 Stat. 543 (1842); Patent Act of 1865, 13 Stat. 533 (1865); Patent Act of
1922, 42 Stat. 392 (1922).
26. See Patent Act of 1832, 4 Stat. 577 (1832).
27. See Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
28. Id.
29. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
30. Winans v. Demead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 337 (1853).
31. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012).
32. Id. at §§ 1-33.
33. Id. at §§ 111-23.
34. Id. at §§ 100-05.
35. Id. at §§ 251-99.
36. Id. at §§ 351-76.
37. See Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109-112 (Apr. 10, 1790).
38. Patent Technology Monitoring Team (PTMT), U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.
(Jun.
2015),
Years
1963---2014,
U.S.
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
39. Brian C. Howard, 2014 Patent Litigation Year in Review, LEX MACHINA (Mar. 26,
2015),
http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/lexmachina/images/2014%20Patent%20Litigation%20Repor
t.pdf.
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B. Damages in Patent Law
Patent law is a creature of statute.40 Contained within 390 sections of the
Modern Patent Act is the whole of the United States’s statutory protection
for patented material.41 Of these sections, only section 284 authorizes
damages.42 This section mirrors common tort law in that it provides for----but does not directly name-----two distinct types of damages: compensatory
and punitive.43
1. Compensatory Damages: An Overview
Compensatory damages, while not the focus of this article, provide the
framework for understanding this article’s position. As often noted by
commentators, compensatory damages are a fairly easy legal concept, but
much more difficult to properly approximate.44
a. Compensatory damages in general
The purpose of compensatory damages in civil cases is to replace by
monetary approximation the fair market value of what a person has lost
because of an offender’s actions.45 A plaintiff may suffer and be
compensated for any type of injury caused by wrongful conduct that can be
reasonably valued such as destroyed property; loss of use of property or

40. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923) (‘‘Patent
property is the creature of statute law and its incidents are equally so and depend upon the
construction to be given to the statutes creating it and them, in view of the policy of
Congress in their enactment.’’).
41. See id.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (‘‘Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall
assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed. Increased damages under this paragraph shall not apply to
provisional rights under section 154(d). The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to
the determination of damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the
circumstances.’’).
43. Id.
44. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Award of compensatory damages under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1081a for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 154 A.L.R. FED. 347
(1999).
45. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 (1979), which states, in relevant part, that
compensatory damages ‘‘are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has
suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.’’).
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chattel; medical expenses; loss of work; psychological injuries; financial
injuries; or physical harms.46
While compensatory damages can be difficult to calculate, especially
when factoring intangible losses or future losses, they must be
approximated at the time of the action and they are paid in full to the victim
at the conclusion of the action.47 According to the Supreme Court,
compensatory damages are distinct from punitive damages because
compensatory damages are given in every civil action in which it is
necessary to make the plaintiff whole-----and they are given for the purpose of
making the plaintiff whole-----while punitive damages are given for the
purpose of making an example of, or deterring the offender from future
misconduct.48
b. Compensatory damages in patent law
Title 35 of the United States Code states that,
[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury,
the court shall assess them.49
In theory, compensatory damages are a simple concept: replace what was
lost. However, in the context of patent law, ‘‘what was lost’’ is the right to
exclusive ownership of an idea. Courts have long struggled with the
appropriate way to value the exclusive possession of an idea.50 Suffice it to
say, this is not an easy task. Countless hours of discovery, argument, and
testimony are generally required in order for a court to make a reasonable

46. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986); Akouri v. Fla. Dep’t
of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005); Randall v. Prince George’s Cty, Md., 302
F.3d 188, 208 (4th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1997).
47. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (Matthew Bender 2015).
48. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 415---23 (discussing the
standards for awarding punitive damages established by Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool
Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
50. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Case Management Judicial Guide § 7.3.4.7
(2009) (‘‘One of the most vexing issues in patent law today relates to the proper measure of
damages.’’); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 628 (2010) (‘‘The calculation of patent
damages has become one of the most contentious issues in all of intellectual property (IP)
law.’’).
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approximation of a party’s losses.51 While the task is no easy one, this
author (and, more importantly, the U.S. Government) is confident that the
adversarial system is capable of producing a fair and just value for loss of
patent exclusivity.
c. Punitive damages: An overview
Courts and legal systems have utilized punitive damages, in one form or
another, since the earliest days of the law.52 In stark contrast to
compensatory damages, punitive damages are extra-compensatory: they
provide monetary compensation beyond the value of harm incurred.53
Furthermore, unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are directed
towards the offender as additional reproof.
(1) The history of punitive damages
The doctrine of punitive damages-----only recently named-----is not a
newcomer to the law, nor is it unique to the United States.54 In fact, the use
of private damages as punishment can be traced back to the earliest origins
of man-made law.55 In nearly all historical instances, the doctrine
(prescribing multiple damages-----or damages in excess of actual damages)
serves three purposes: (1) to provide the courts with a means of increased
punishment for behavior, (2) to provide an increased deterrent for certain

51. See Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, 2013 Report of the Economic Survey: Overview,
http://www.ipisc.com/custdocs/2013aipla%20survey.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2016) (showing
that where the amount in question in a patent claim is between $1 million-$25 million,
defending the claim costs an average of $1.7 million at the end of discovery and $2.8 million
after trial).
52. See supra Part II.
53. Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (‘‘Although compensatory
damages and punitive damages are typically awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes. The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that
the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. The latter, which
have been described as ‘quasi-criminal,’ operate as ‘private fines’ intended to punish the
defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A jury’s assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s
injuries is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is
an expression of its moral condemnation . . . .’’) (citation omitted).
54. Francis Scott Baldwin, Punitive Damages Revisited, INT’L ACAD. OF TRIAL LAW.,
http://www.iatl.net/files/public/93_punitive_i4a.pdf (‘‘The doctrine of punitive damages is
not a ‘Johnny come late’ to the law. It has been known for centuries. It is a doctrine that
evolved largely to protect the little person against the wrongs of the economically strong and
powerful.’’).
55. David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v.
Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 370 (1965-1966).
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types of tortious activity, and (3) to provide a necessary remedy against the
abuse of power by economic elites.56
The Mosaic Law, for example, provided for special damages using a
system of fines.57 In cases involving chattel, the Mosaic Law set forth that,
‘‘[w]hen someone steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it, he shall
restore five oxen for the one ox, and four sheep for the one sheep.’’58 In the
setting of intentional torts, the Mosaic Law states that, ‘‘[w]hen men have a
fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she suffers a miscarriage, but no
further injury, the guilty one shall be fined as much as the woman’s
husband demands of him, and he shall pay in the presence of the judges.’’59
Similarly, the Babylonian Hammurabi Code and the Hindu Code of
Manu both contain provisions for multiple damages and awards in excess of
actual loss.60 By the time of Plato, compensation had been distinguished
from punishment:
[w]hen any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law
will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like
again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and
he must in addition pay for the hurt.61
Roman law also provided for multiple damages, often to constrain the
actions of wealthy elites.62
Commentators generally agree63 that the modern doctrine of punitive
damages can trace its origins to two English cases from 1763: Huckle v.
Money64 and Wilkes v. Woods.65 In Wilkes and Huckle-----cases arising out of

56. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1287-90 (1993).
57. Id. at 1285 n.81.
58. Exodus 21:37 (New American Bible Revised Edition).
59. Exodus 21:22 (New American Bible Revised Edition).
60. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 56, at 1285; James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984)
(noting that statutes providing for awards in excess of actual damages existed in Hindu Code
of Manu and Code of Hammurabi).
61. PLATO, LAWS IX (Benjamin Jowett trans., 360 B.C.), http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/
laws.9.ix.html.
62. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 56, at 1286 (‘‘One Lucius Veratius used to amuse
himself by striking those whom he met in the streets in the face, and then tendering them the
legal amends, from a wallet which a slave carried after him for that purpose.’’).
63. Jeff Duncan Brecht, Oregon’s Procedural Due Process and the Necessity of Judicial
Review of Punitive Damage Awards: Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg: ‘‘Stop the insanity!’’ 15 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 377, 381 (1995).
64. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768.
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the same events-----agents of the King arrested Wilkes and Huckle, both
English citizens, during a raid on Wilkes’s home conducted in a search for
the author and distributor of ‘‘North Briton,’’ a pamphlet that disparaged
the monarch.66 Huckle had no connection to the pamphlet, but was
detained along with Wilkes for a number of hours.67 Like the Greeks and
Romans before them, the English considered it imperative that the poor
have some means to prevent the oppression of social elites. Accordingly, the
English courts granted both Wilkes and Huckle damage awards in excess of
their actual damages (which were minimal).68 Lord Camden, author and
presiding justice in Huckle, stated:
[T]hey [the jury] saw a magistrate over all the King’s subjects
exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta [sic], and
attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting
upon the legality of this general warrant before them; they heard
the King’s Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury
endeavoring to support and maintain the legality of the warrant
in a tyrannical and severe manner. These are the ideas which
struck the jury on the trial; and I think they have done right in
giving exemplary damages.69
Together, these two cases formed the legal foundation for punitive
damages in England, a doctrine that opens the door to additional damages
in cases of intentional and aggravated misconduct to serve as punishment
on the defendant where the actual damages do not serve as an adequate
deterrent.70 This doctrine, then called ‘‘exemplary damages,’’ was adopted by
the judiciary of a fledgling nation just across the ocean.71
65. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489. Of note, commentators consider Wilkes v.
Wood to be the legal foundation for the United States Fourth Amendment. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 772 (1994).
66. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep at 489.
67. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769.
68. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489; Linda J. Guss, Punitive Damages Under Uninsured
Motorist Coverage------Oregon’s Probable Approach, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 933, 938 (1988).
Wilkes brought an action for trespass, and Huckle sought damages for trespass and false
imprisonment. Id. Oddly enough, not only was Huckle left, by and large, unscathed by the
event, fed ‘‘beefsteake [sic] and beer’’ and treated well during his brief imprisonment, he was
awarded ‘‘300 pounds in damages, which was nearly 300 times his weekly wages.’’ Id. at 938
n.32
69. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769.
70. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, § 355, at 687,
701 (Arthur G. Sedgwick & Joseph H. Beale eds., 9th ed. 1912) (‘‘In actions of tort, when
gross fraud, wantonness, malice, or oppression appears, the jury [is] not bound to adhere to
the strict line of compensation, but may, by a severer verdict, at once impose a punishment
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(2) Punitive damages in the United States: a brief history
American courts adopted the doctrine of exemplary damages soon after
the doctrine’s birth in England. In 1784, the first reported American case
involving such damages was decided in Genay v. Norris.72
In Genay v. Norris, the Supreme Court of South Carolina awarded
punitive damages to a plaintiff because of injuries that he received after he
drank wine that was secretly tainted by the defendant.73 In Genay, the
plaintiff and defendant, who were both intoxicated, planned to settle a
quarrel between them with a duel.74 Shortly before the duel was to take
place, the defendant, a physician, proposed a toast of reconciliation.75
Contrary to the apparent gesture of goodwill, the defendant secretly spiked
the wine with a large dose of cantharides, poisoning the plaintiff.76 The
court awarded the plaintiff what it termed ‘‘very exemplary damages’’
against the physician-defendant for intentionally causing him ‘‘extreme and
excruciating pain.’’77 The court instructed the jury that ‘‘a very serious injury
to the plaintiff . . . entitled him to very exemplary damages, especially from
a professional character, who could not plead ignorance of the operation,
and powerful effects of this medicine.’’78
So from the beginning, punitive damages in the United States have been
used to protect the weak and powerless from the aggression of the
powerful-----either economic, intellectual, or social-----by allowing courts to
exact from them greater monetary punishment for intentional wrongdoing.
In Coryell v. Colbaugh, shortly after Genay, the New Jersey Supreme
Court followed its sister court in awarding punitive damages, this time
against a defendant who breached his promise to marry the plaintiff.79 In
Coryell, the jury awarded additional damages to make an example of the
defendant, after being instructed by the judge ‘‘not to estimate the damages

on the defendant, and hold him [or her] up as an example to the community. It might be
said, indeed, that the malicious character of the defendant’s intent does, in fact, increase the
injury, and the doctrine of exemplary damages might thus be reconciled with the strict
notion of compensation; . . . [T]he idea of compensation is abandoned and that of
punishment introduced.’’).
71. See Brecht, supra note 63, at 382.
72. Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6 (1 Bay 6) (1784).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90, 91 (1791).
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by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for
example’s sake, to prevent such offenses in [the] future.’’80
Coryell illustrates a second important principle of punitive damages: to
serve as an example and warning to others that certain types of behavior
will not be tolerated by civilized society. Unlike the defendant in Genay, the
defendant in Coryell was actually a poor man.81 Nonetheless, the Chief
Justice held,
[t]hat the defendant’s poverty ought not to prevent exemplary
damages; that poverty was no justification or extenuation of a
crime like this, and it was their duty to measure the injury he had
done, and not the purse of the defendant; that it would be better
to treat him in this manner than, by giving small damages, to
countenance an idea that a man, because poor, should be let
loose on society.82
Punitive damages thus serve the important purpose of imposing a greater
degree of punishment on an offender when typical damages do not suffice.
Not only do these damages serve to make the defendant an example for
others, an express goal of the Chief Justice in Coryell, they also give
additional incentive to the defendant to forswear his behavior.83 Coryell
gives a clear example of how punitive damages may be used as a ‘‘quasicriminal punishment’’ in a civil case.84 Since Coryell, commentators, judges,
and legislators alike have struggled with this apparent overlap of legal

80. Id.
81. Id. The level of poverty was especially acute when compared with the physiciandefendant in Genay.
82. Id.
83. Id. (‘‘He concluded by observing that it was a serious matter-----involved in it the
protection of innocence, the prevention of disgrace to families, and the punishment of
offences too common, and too often lightly treated.’’).
84. See supra Part II; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing punitive damages as ‘‘quasi-criminal punishment’’);
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989)
(‘‘[P]unitive damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also
among the interests advanced by the criminal law . . . .’’); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that punitive damage awards are ‘‘quasicriminal’’); Owen, supra note 11, at 1259-60 (detailing the purpose of punitive damages in
products liability litigation); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Addressing the Problem of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 43 (19831984) (addressing quasi-criminal nature of punitive sanctions).
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discipline.85 Since defendants in civil cases are not given the same
procedural protections as criminal defendants, can they constitutionally be
required to pay quasi-criminal sentences without these protections?
In 1851, in Day v. Woodworth, the Supreme Court stated that the
doctrine of punitive damages was supported by ‘‘repeated judicial decisions
for more than a century,’’ and gave in depth explanation of the function and
purpose of the doctrine.86 In Woodworth, the owners of a mill dam brought
suit against the owners of the adjacent mill for forcibly taking down part of
the dam after alleging that it was damaging the mill.87 Justice Grier, writing
for the majority, stated that:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may
inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence
rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. We are
aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by
some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a
century are to be received as the best exposition of what the law
is, the question will not admit of argument. . . . [W]here the
injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross and outrageous,
courts permit juries to add to the measured compensation of the
plaintiff which he would have been entitled to recover, had the
injury been inflicted without design or intention, something
farther by way of punishment or example, which has sometimes
been called ‘smart money.’ This has been always left to the
discretion of the jury . . . It must be evident, also, that as it
depends upon the degree of malice, wantonness, oppression, or
outrage of the defendant’s conduct, the punishment of his
delinquency cannot be measured by the expenses of the plaintiff
in prosecuting his suit.88
Justice Grier stated that the jury may inflict punitive damages (synonymous
with exemplary damages) in order to punish the delinquency more

85. See generally Janice Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive Damages: An Analysis
of Constitutional and Other Challenges to Punitive Damages, Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1, 26 (1995).
86. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
87. Id. at 363-64.
88. Id. at 371.
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adquately.89 Furthermore, wanton, malicious, gross, or outrageous conduct
is prerequisite to these increased damages.90
In sum, punitive damages in this nation are modeled after exemplary and
multiple damages doctrines that have been used throughout the world’s
history. More specifically, they exist as legal measures that are directed in all
respects toward the offender in an action. Their goal-----quite unlike
compensatory damages-----is not to compensate the plaintiff for any actual
harm suffered, but rather to punish or reform the offender by requiring that
they pay substantially more for their offense.
(3) Punitive damages in patent law
Patent law is a creature of statute.91 So too are its damages. The modern
version of the patent statute allows for the possibility of treble damages for
willful infringement.92 But this possibility did not always exist. Before the
modern patent statute, punitive damages were available only under
common law-----and infrequently given.
Boston Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske was one of the first patent claim cases
in America to involve punitive damages.93 In Fiske, a case involving patent
infringement that was analogous to a previously decided admiralty case,
Justice Story, writing for the majority, stated:
[I]t is far from being uncommon in the admiralty to allow costs
and expences, and to mulct the offending parties, even in
exemplary damages, where the nature of the case requires it. . . .
Courts of admiralty allow such items, not technically as costs, but
on the same principles, as they are often allowed damages in
cases of torts, by courts of common law, as a recompense for
injuries sustained, as exemplary damages, or as a remuneration
for expences incurred, or losses sustained, by the misconduct of
the other party.94
Like Coryell, the Fiske Court treated punitive damages in patent claims
under the common law in largely the same as they were in all other civil
claims.95
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012).
92. Id. at § 284.
93. Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 1681).
94. Id. at 957.
95. See Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90, 91 (1791) (allowing punitive damages in the
setting of willful, wanton, or malicious conduct).
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Since that time, and through the multiple iterations of the Patent Act,96
Congress has more thoroughly addressed patent damages. Today, Title 35
of the United States Code addresses all available forms of damages in patent
actions, including punitive damages.97 Punitive damages-----though only
called ‘‘increased damages’’98 in the section-----are found along with
compensatory damages in 35 U.S.C. § 284:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury,
the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.
Increased damages under this paragraph shall not apply to
provisional rights under section 154(d).99
Under this section, a court may award exemplary damages up to three times
the actual damages.100 This additional amount, if assessed, is awarded to the
plaintiff in the action.101
Clearly, § 284 is a short section that does not answer every question
about damages in patent actions. Here, like in most other legal fields, a bevy
of case law serves to flesh out the statute. Despite the frequency of punitive
damages awarded in patent claims, however, the Supreme Court has
considered punitive damages in patent law only rarely.102 Where damages
are awarded, the Court has typically required a degree of willful or wanton
conduct as a prerequisite. The imposition of these damages, however, was
considerably more in flux.
In Seymour v. McCormick, an 1854 case involving the patent of a grainharvesting machine, the Court upheld a change to the Patent Act of 1836
that limited the power to assess punitive damages to the court-----instead of
the jury.103 The Court stated that:
96. See supra Part II.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 284. Section 284 has been in its current form since 2009, when it
underwent small edits from the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
98. Id. While perhaps little more than a semantic quibble, commentators and courts
agree that despite being called ‘‘increased damages’’ in the section, that these are in fact
punitive damages.
99. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
102. CHISUM, supra note 47, at § 20.03.
103. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853).
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there is no good reason why taking a man’s property in an
invention should be trebly punished, while the measure of
damages as to other property is single and actual damages. It is
true, where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict
vindictive or exemplary damages, not to recompense the
plaintiff, but to punish the defendant. In order to obviate this
injustice, the Patent Act of 1836 confines the jury to the
assessment of ‘‘actual damages.’’ The power to inflict vindictive
or punitive damages is committed to the discretion and
judgment of the court within the limit of trebling the actual
damages found by the jury.104
This holding, one of the first under the modern patent era, established that
the Court holds the power to inflict punitive damages on a plaintiff.
Since that time, the Court in Clark v. Wooster and in Topliff v. Topliff
continued to expand and clarify the definitions of patentable terms, damage
perquisites, damage calculations, and exemplary damages.105
(4) The ‘‘increased damages’’ in 35 U.S.C. § 284 are punitive
damages
As a final preliminary matter, it is important-----albeit relatively
straightforward-----to establish that the treble damages provided for in 35
U.S.C. § 284 are, in fact, punitive damages. While there are some who argue
that treble damages do not fall within the technical definition of punitive
damages,106 this reasoning is untenable for two reasons.
First, treble damages are punitive because, like punitive damages, they
are generally premised on willful infringement or bad faith.107 Treble
damages are provided for in only a limited number of places in the U.S.
Code. Of these, three areas are most notable: (1) for civil remedies against

104. Id. at 488-89.
105. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156 (1892); Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322 (1886).
106. See, e.g., Robert S. Murphy, Arizona Rico, Treble Damages, and Punitive Damages:
Which One Does Not Belong?, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299 (1990) (suggesting a differentiation
between treble damages and punitive damages in the setting of the federal RICO statute);
Charles A. Sullivan, Breaking Up The Treble Play: Attacks On The Private Treble Damage
Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 17, 56 (1983) (arguing that treble damages are not
punitive); Lawrence Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or
Compensatory, 28 KY. L. J. 117, 119 (1940) (arguing that in the context of antitrust litigation,
treble damages should be seen as compensatory, not punitive).
107. See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (‘‘It is
well-settled that enhancement of damages must be premised on willful infringement or bad
faith.’’).
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commerce and trade monopolies,108 (2) for civil remedies against
racketeering,109 and (3) for damages in patent infringement.110 In these
sections, as well as in the common law, ‘‘enhancement of damages must be
premised on willful infringement or bad faith.’’111 According to the Federal
Circuit in Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., ‘‘[e]nhancement is not a
substitute for perceived inadequacies in the calculation of actual damages,
but depends on a showing of willful infringement or other indicium of bad
faith warranting punitive damages.’’112 Therefore, enhanced damages are
punitive in nature because they are applied only when there is bad faith
warranting extra punitive measures.
Second, the circuits have treated enhanced damages, including the treble
damages of 35 U.S.C. § 284, as punitive.113 As the Federal Circuit elaborated
in Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co.,
enhancement of damages under § 284 requires a showing of ‘‘willful
infringement or bad faith’’-----language that mirrors that of punitive
damages.114 Section 284’s increased damages, therefore, are by nature
punitive.

108. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (‘‘Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.’’).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (‘‘Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to
establish a violation of section 1962.’’).
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
111. Yarway Corp., 775 F.2d at 277.
112. Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
113. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (stating that absent willful infringement, enhanced damages are usually not
warranted).
114. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting Yarway Corp. v. Eur---Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW: A CALL FOR REFORM
A. A Punitive Controversy
It is no secret that punitive damages have been the cause of much
controversy in recent years.115 Commentators, judges, legislators, and----perhaps most importantly-----the public have all become increasingly aware
of the growing frequency and size of punitive damage awards in civil cases
and have grown increasingly alarmed at the trend.116 Kimberly A. Pace
quotes Justice O’Conner in describing this trend:
As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were ‘‘rarely
assessed’’ and usually ‘‘small in amount.’’ Recently, however, the
frequency and size of such awards have been skyrocketing. One
commentator has observed that ‘‘hardly a month goes by without
a multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a product
liability case.’’ And it appears that the upward trajectory
continues unabated.117
Ms. Pace continues to argue that, ‘‘[a]n increase in the magnitude and
frequency of punitive damage awards, however, necessitates a
reconsideration of the doctrine and precipitates the need for safeguards to
protect the tort system from abuse.’’118 She opines that punitive damage
reform must be forthcoming to deal with the many shortcomings of the
doctrine, namely,
that punitive damages cause unnecessary litigation; are
unjustified and excessive; far exceed statutory penalties for
similar conduct; subject defendants to multiple punishments for
the same conduct; overcompensate plaintiffs; are detrimental to
115. See
Punitive
Damages
Reform,
AM .
TORT
REFORM
ASS’N,
http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
116. Id.
117. Pace, supra note 5, at 1574-76 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 500 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (‘‘Perhaps most troubling, however, is the fact
that although punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature, they are imposed in the course
of civil litigation without many of the procedural safeguards that accompany criminal
penalties. The rise in punitive damage awards and the need to implement safeguards have
not gone unnoticed by state legislatures, the judiciary, and various other entities. Forty-six
states have passed tort reform legislation; there is a new Restatement of Torts; the Supreme
Court has rejected a punitive damage award as unconstitutionally excessive; and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently approved a Model Punitive
Damages Act.’’ (citations omitted)).
118. Id. at 1575.
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society because they handicap the competitiveness of American
businesses; are responsible for rising insurance costs; and are
unconstitutional on a variety of grounds.119
Each of these grounds is deserving of discussion, and some have more merit
than others. For the purposes of succinctness, this Comment will only
address the three most prominent.
First, legal scholars suggest that punitive damages serve as an incentive
for unnecessary litigation.120 It is no secret that the promise of a punitive
damages award is a powerful motivator for plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Even when the award amounts are constitutionally limited to single digit
ratios, as they have been in BMW Inc. v. Gore121 and State Farm v.
Campbell,122 the promise of even single digit multiples of actual damages is a
very attractive one. In the patent law setting, where the maximum punitive
recovery is a three-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, a
favorable verdict can still result in a significant windfall.123 Proponents of
the current doctrine of punitive damages argue that plaintiffs who have
suffered legitimate harm at the hands of defendants, in any type of civil
action, are more entitled to damages arising out of the action than anyone
else.124 While it is true that the plaintiffs have suffered at the hands of the
defendant, they have already been completely made whole by compensatory
damages.125 Commentators argue that in practice, compensatory damages
may not always completely compensate the plaintiff, due to multiple factors,
including:
[1] statutory limits on recovery of damages for pain and
suffering, [2] statutory limits on recovery of damages in medical
malpractice cases, [3] insolvency of responsible parties combined

119. Id.
120. See J. Fieweger, The Need for Reform of Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 775, 816 (1990).
121. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581-82, 585-86 (1996) (holding that a 500-to1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was grossly excessive and violated the
due process clause of the Constitution).
122. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (discussing
how greater than single-digit ratios of punitive to compensatory damages will almost never
be allowed to stand out of due process concerns).
123. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
124. See Pace, supra note 5, at 1579-80.
125. Jill Wieber Lens, Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory Damages in Tort
and Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 59 KAN. L. REV. 231, 231 (2010) (‘‘[I]n tort law, the
purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole by putting him in the same
position as if the tort had not occurred.’’).
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with pro rata fault statute, and [4] limitations on the
available amount of coverage under insurance policies.126
However, these arguments fail to correctly understand the nature of
compensatory and punitive damages. If compensatory damages awards are
not properly compensating plaintiffs for their losses, this shortcoming must
be addressed and remedied in their own right, not compensated for with
other, ill-fitting legal remedies. To assume that punitive damages can and
should be awarded as a stop-gap to fill the hole left by inadequate
compensatory damages makes punitive damages-----a measure designed for
extraordinary circumstances-----dangerously ordinary.
Second, legal scholars suggest that punitive damages overcompensate
plaintiffs. This critique also has merit. Commentators have long argued that
when punitive damages are awarded to a plaintiff, the plaintiff experiences
an unjust windfall.127 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in
Smith v. Wade, stated that
[a] fundamental premise of our legal system is the notion that
damages are awarded to compensate the victim-----to redress the
injuries that he or she actually suffered. . . . [T]he doctrine of
punitive damages permits the award of ‘‘damages’’ beyond even
the most generous and expansive conception of actual injury to
the plaintiff.128
Third, legal scholars suggest that punitive damages subject defendants to
multiple punishments for the same conduct.129 Commentators and judges
have long been concerned that punitive damages subject defendants to a
form of double jeopardy for their actions, since punitive damages are a
quasi-criminal punishment.130 While there is merit to this concern, it has

126. Lee Katherine Goldstein, Splitting Punitive Damages with the State, 38 COLO. LAW.
105 (2009) (arguing that the idea of punitive damages as a windfall is a myth and must be
dispelled).
127. Leo M. Stepanian II, The Feasibility Of Full State Extraction Of Punitive Damages
Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 301, 305-06 (1994) (‘‘Nevertheless, where a plaintiff recovers
compensatory damages for the harm he or she suffered and also recovers punitive damages,
the plaintiff is overcompensated, and, thus, receives a windfall.’’).
128. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 57-59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that
punitive damages encourage unnecessary litigation).
129. See generally Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003).
130. The ‘‘quasi-criminal’’ or penal nature of punitive damages attracted the attention of
the United States Supreme Court. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
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little bearing on the purposes of this Comment, because it questions the
efficacy of punitive damages in general, not their prospective targets.
Finally, it is important to note that while punitive damage awards are
becoming more frequent, they are not necessarily becoming larger or
subject to runaway jury sympathies.131 Judges frequently limit high punitive
damages awards before the end of a lawsuit’s lifecycle.132 In a study of
punitive damage verdicts, Rustad and Koening found that there was a great
difference between punitive damages awarded and punitive damages
upheld.133 They found that forty percent of all cases involving punitive
damages were settled prior to appeal, and that ‘‘nearly one-third of the
verdicts in the sample were ultimately reversed or remitted by appellate
panels.’’134
However, the fact that punitive damage awards are neither as outrageous
nor as frequent as the media portrays them, does not change the
philosophic argument against awarding punitive damages to a fully
compensated plaintiff. This concern would be present even if punitive
damages were extraordinarily rare-----something they are certainly not.135
Furthermore, while extreme punitive damage awards may be mitigated on
appeal, this involves lengthy and costly legal footwork on the part of both
plaintiffs and defendants, and greatly encumbers the judicial economy. It is
wise, in the setting of potentially extraordinary punitive damage awards that
would necessitate mitigation, to remove the incentive for plaintiffs to seek
(and juries to award) such exorbitant amounts.

excessive fines and penalties does not apply to the award of punitive damages in a case
between two private parties).
131. See Mark Peterson et. al, Punitive Damages: Empirical Findings, RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE 28 (1987), http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3311.html (reporting results
from California punitive damages study); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT
LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES 46 (1989) (documenting that
judges reduced punitive damages awards in 29% of studied product liability cases).
132. See Pace, supra note 5, at 1587.
133. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 56, at 1308 n.187; William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33-36.
134. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55 (1992) (reporting findings from
nationwide study of the size, incidence, and characteristics of punitive damages in products
liability from 1965-1990).
135. See THOMAS H. COHEN & KYLE HARBECK, PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS IN STATE
COURTS, 2005 (Office of Justice Programs 2011) (finding that 12% of plaintiffs seek punitive
damages and that punitive damages are ultimately awarded in 5% of trials where the plaintiff
prevailed).
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B. Split-Recovery: a Wise Compromise
In the last half-century, the states have been busy enacting tort reform
legislation to combat the increasing frequency of punitive damage awards.
To date, thirteen states have enacted split-recovery statutes that redirect
punitive damage awards to the public instead of to the individual, eight of
which are still in effect.136 Indeed, even some of the most ardent opponents
of punitive damage reform agree that punitive damage awards in some
contexts are best given to state for public use. David Owen, professor of tort
law at the University of South Carolina, writes in a scholarly piece
defending the non-compensatory nature of punitive damages that:
Since punitive damages are noncompensatory, they provide the
plaintiff with an undeserved ‘‘windfall,’’ and the public-----whose
interests are supposedly vindicated by such assessments-----is left
without any monetary benefit from the penal fine. The ‘‘windfall’’
argument is largely answered above in terms of the important
instrumental effect of such ‘‘windfalls’’ in achieving the
educative,
retributive
(or
restitutionary),
deterrent,
compensatory and law enforcement functions of punitive
damages. However, where a plaintiff recovers an enormous
verdict, . . . then it seems appropriate for the ‘‘excess’’ portion to
be handed over to the public’s representative, perhaps to finance
public law enforcement in the future, or for some other public
good, preferably to help ameliorate the type of social problem
attributable to the type of misconduct engaged in by the
defendant.137
Even Professor Owen-----a staunch supporter of plaintiff’s receiving punitive
damages138-----agrees that in certain scenarios, punitive damages are better

136. See Skyler Sanders, Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Problem: A Federal
Split-Recovery Statute or a Federal Tax, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 785, 803 (2013). Alaska,
California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah currently retain their splitrecovery statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (2004); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5(b) (West
2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207
(2003); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1999); IOWA CODE. § 668A.1(2) (1998); MO. ANN. STAT. §
537.675(g) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2003); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201 (2004).
As discussed infra Part III.B., Colorado’s statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987),
was declared unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court in Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co.,
818 P.2d 262, 266 n.5 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
137. See Owen, supra note 11, at 413 (emphasis added).
138. See id. at 381 (‘‘[T]he variety of goals served by punitive damages present a powerful
case for making them generally available within a system of private law.’’).
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directed towards the public representative than the plaintiff. Nine states
agree with Mr. Owen.
In Florida, one of the first split-recovery states, the legislature enacted a
measure that, (1) limits punitive damages to three times the award of
compensatory damages, unless a plaintiff can demonstrate by ‘‘clear and
convincing’’ evidence that a higher award would not be excessive, and (2)
requires sixty percent of the award to be paid to the state’s General Fund or
Medical Assistance Trust Fund.139
Iowa’s statute, first enacted in 1986, introduces a subtle twist to splitrecovery.140 The statute provides that where the ‘‘conduct of the defendant
was directed specifically at the claimant, or at the person from which the
claimant’s claim is derived,’’ any punitive damage award shall be given in
full to the claimant.141 However, if the conduct of the defendant was not
directed specifically at the claimant, ‘‘twenty-five percent of the punitive or
exemplary damages awarded may be ordered paid to the claimant, with the
remainder of the award to be ordered paid into a civil reparations trust fund
administered by the state court administrator.’’142
In Indiana, the approach is more traditional. The Indiana Code provides
that twenty-five percent of a punitive damage award is to go the claimant,
and the remaining seventy-five percent ‘‘to the treasurer of state, who shall
deposit the funds into the violent crime victims compensation fund . . . .’’143
Oregon’s split-recovery statute divides punitive damage awards between
three entities. Section 31.735 of the Oregon Revised Statutes states that
thirty percent of a punitive award is payable to the prevailing party, sixty
percent is payable to the Attorney General for deposit in the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime
Victims Assistance Section, and ten percent is deposited in the State Court
Facilities and Security Account.144
Four other states follow similar models to the above-----though with subtle
differences in the amount of recovery or the destination of the funds. This
author-----following the reasoning of other commentators and states145-----

139. FLA. STAT. § 768.73.
140. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2) (1998).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (2007).
144. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2003).
145. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages As Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
453 (2003) (stating that ‘‘societal damages represent[] both a necessary and feasible
reconceptualization of the civil damages landscape.’’); Meredith M. Thoms, Punitive
Damages in Texas: Examining the Need for A Split-Recovery Statute, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 207
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suggests that the federal system of patent law would best serve the interests
of justice if it followed the lead of these states and split punitive damages
between the plaintiff and the state.
III. CONCERNS ABOUT SPLIT-RECOVERY IN PATENT LAW
This Comment would be incomplete without a thorough discussion and
review of the concerns that commentators, judges, and-----most vocally----plaintiffs, have raised with respect to split-recovery. These arguments tend
to fall within one of five broad categories: (1) that punitive damages-----while
non-compensatory in theory-----are often used by courts as a compensatory
tool; (2) that punitive damages do serve a compensatory purpose for
plaintiffs who have to pay attorneys fees in civil action; (3) that split
remedies represent a ‘‘taking’’ under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution; (4) that split-recovery is intrinsically unfair to plaintiffs; and
(5) that improper incentive will merely be shifted to the government, and
will encourage imposition of high or unnecessary punitive damage awards
in order to bolster the federal coffers.
A. Punitive Damages as a Compensatory Tool
Legal commentators have long suggested that punitive damages, while
technically wholly extra-compensatory measures intended to punish and
discourage reprehensible behavior, are often used by courts and juries in the
real world146 to compensate plaintiffs where traditional compensatory
damages are insufficient.147 It is often the case that damages in tort claims
are difficult to calculate. When damages are uncertain, simple
compensatory damage calculations are ineffective to justly compensate the
plaintiff for the wrong done, and must be augmented.

(2003); Clay R. Stevens, Split-Recovery: A Constitutional Answer to the Punitive Damage
Dilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 857 (1994); see also discussion, supra, Part III.B.
146. See, e.g., Daniel A. Barfield, Better to Give Than to Receive: Should Nonprofit
Corporations and Charities Pay Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1193, 1206 n.66 (1995)
(‘‘There is some authority for the proposition that punitive damages are compensatory in
nature and merely have an incidental punishing effect. According to this view, punitive
damages compensate for intangible losses, such as emotional distress, humiliation, insult, or
vexation, which arise from malicious wrongs. However, this function of punitive damages
has diminished with the development of awards for pain and suffering, mental distress, and
hedonic damages.’’) (internal citations omitted).
147. See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831 (Conn. 1967) (holding that
punitive damages are compensatory in nature and therefore may not exceed plaintiff’s
litigation expenses, minus taxable costs).
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Other scholars argue that the technical definition of punitive damages
must be preserved.148 They argue that even though courts often imperfectly
apply legal concepts, that is not grounds for destruction of those concepts.149
Furthermore, they argue that if punitive damages are treated as
compensatory, it would materially prejudice plaintiffs against whom there
was no malice or egregious behavior warranting a ‘‘compensatory’’ punitive
damage award.150
There would be a case for legitimate disagreement on this point if legal
scholars were the lone voices in this conversation. They are not. The
Supreme Court recently reiterated the principle that ‘‘punitive damages are
not compensatory’’ and consequently are not an available remedy to ‘‘make
good’’ a harm.151 In light of this holding, and the Court’s stance on punitive
damages in the last half century, punitive damages are-----and must continue
to be-----founded primarily on concerns of compensating the plaintiff. If
such concerns continue to exist after compensatory damages are awarded,
the entitlement should not be to the whole of the punitive award, but to
only a part.
B. ‘‘Takings’’ Concerns Under the Fifth Amendment
The tort reform era of the late twentieth century saw a number of
limitations on civil remedies, particularly in the sphere of punitive damages.
As noted above,152 since 1985, thirteen states have enacted split-recovery

148. See, e.g., Lisa Benedetti, What’s Past is Prologue: Why the Prison Litigation Reform
Act Does Not------And Should Not------Classify Punitive Damages as Prospective Relief, 85 WASH.
L. REV. 131, 155 (2010) (‘‘Subjecting punitive damages to the need-narrowness-intrusiveness
standard would debilitate punitive damages by failing to take into consideration the goals of
punishment and deterrence when evaluating them for reasonableness, thereby significantly
reducing their deterrent and punitive effect. Furthermore, given that a person seeking
punitive damages must satisfy the extremely high burden of proving not only that his rights
were violated but also that the violation was motivated by malice or callous indifference,
reducing or eliminating those awards based on the inapt need-narrowness-intrusiveness
standard would cripple a key legal tool available only for the few prisoners who most need it
and who can satisfy that high burden.’’).
149. Sharkey, supra note 145, at 449.
150. Benedetti, supra note 148, at 154.
151. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002).
152. See supra Part III.
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statutes, eight of which remain after legislative action153 and judicial
challenges.154
In Demendoza v. Huffman, the Oregon Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of Oregon’s split-recovery statute.155 The court determined
that the statute,156 which required the judgment creditor to pay the state a
sixty percent share of any punitive damage award, was constitutional under
the Fifth Amendment.157 The court found that ‘‘plaintiffs have no
underlying right to receive an award that reflects the jury’s determination of
the amount of punitive damages, nor are those damages necessary to
compensate plaintiffs for a loss or injury [to them].’’158 In the opinion, the
court cited Lane County v. Wood and Noe v. Kaiser Foundation, which
described punitive damages as a ‘‘legal spanking’’159 and ‘‘only justified on
the theory of determent.’’160 The court concluded that the purpose of
punitive damages was quasi-criminal-----that is, give the state the ability to
punish the defendant in tort-----but not to ‘‘give the plaintiff revenge.’’161
Therefore, plaintiffs have no interest in the award, and cannot assert a Fifth
Amendment takings claim.162 Accordingly, the court upheld Oregon’s splitrecovery statute, despite the size of the state’s appropriation.163
153. See Sanders, supra note 136, at 804 n.97 (stating that of the states which have not
maintained their split-recovery statutes, four allowed the statutes to expire without renewal:
California, Florida, Kansas, and New York).
154. See Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (overturning Colorado’s
split-recovery statute as unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment); McBride v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (declaring the Georgia split-recovery
statute unconstitutional because ‘‘there can be no legitimate purpose for a state to involve
itself in the area of civil damage litigation between private parties wherein punitive damages
are a legitimate item of recovery, where the State, through the legislative process, preempts
for itself a share of the award.’’).
155. Demendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002).
156. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1995).
157. Demendoza, 51 P.3d at 1248 (‘‘As we explained in the previous section, the
distribution of punitive damages is not a matter within a jury’s discretion or, even, a matter
that it considers. As it has done in other areas of the law, by enacting ORS 18.540 the
legislature has established reasonable guidelines for courts to follow in the exercise of their
duties.’’) (internal citations omitted).
158. Id. at 1244 (internal citations omitted).
159. Lane County v. Wood, 691 P.2d 473, 479 (Or. 1984) (‘‘Punitive damages are not to
compensate an injured party, but to give bad actors a legal spanking.’’).
160. Noe v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 435 P.2d 306, 308 (Or. 1967) (‘‘Punitive damages can
only be justified on the theory of determent.’’).
161. Id. (quoting Donald Paul Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon, 44
OR. L. REV. 175, 182 (1965)) (emphasis added).
162. Demendoza, 51 P.3d at at1243.
163. Id. at 1245-46.
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In contrast, in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., the Colorado Supreme
Court found split-recovery to be unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment.164 There, the court considered a Colorado statute which
required the judgment creditor to pay the state general fund one-third of
the judgment for exemplary damages.165 The Colorado court found that a
judgment for exemplary damages was property, and the legislature could
not take away property rights vested by a judgment.166 The court then
entered into a lengthy, topic-by-topic analysis of all the possible legal
justifications for the statute.167 The court found that the statute was not any
of the following: a valid penalty or forfeiture,168 an ad valorum property
tax,169 a valid excise tax,170 or a valid user fee.171 The court concluded by
stating that:
In our view, forcing a judgment creditor to pay to the state
general fund one-third of a judgment for exemplary damages in
order to fund services which have already been funded by other
revenue-raising measures, and without conferring on the
judgment creditor any benefit or service not furnished to other
civil litigants not required to make the same contribution,
amounts to an unconstitutional taking of the judgment creditor’s
property in violation of the Taking[s] Clause of the United States
and the Colorado Constitutions.172
164. Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
165. Id. at 270, 273 (‘‘As we previously observed, while a judgment for exemplary
damages is designed to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar conduct by others, it is only
available when a civil wrong has been committed under extremely aggravating circumstances
and when the injured party has a successful claim for actual damages against the wrongdoer.
In that sense, an exemplary damages award is not totally devoid of any and all reparative
elements. More importantly, the forced contribution of one-third of the exemplary damages
judgment is imposed not on the defendant wrongdoer who caused the injuries but upon the
plaintiff who suffered the wrong. It goes without saying that placing the burden of payment
on the judgment creditor who suffered the wrong bears no reasonable relationship to any
arguable goal of punishing the wrongdoer or deterring others from engaging in similar
conduct.’’ (internal citations omitted)).
166. Id. at 269 (‘‘Because a judgment for exemplary damages entitles the judgment
creditor to a satisfaction out of the real and personal property of the judgment debtor, the
taking of a money judgment from the judgment creditor is substantially equivalent to the
taking of money itself.’’).
167. Id. at 270-72.
168. Id. at 270.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 271.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 272.
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Accordingly, the Colorado Court struck down the split-recovery statute.173
The Colorado court correctly determined that an award of exemplary
damages constituted a property interest. However, it erred in determining
that either the plaintiff or the judgment creditor had an interest in that
award. If a person is to have an interest in property, the imperative question
is: what gives rise to that interest? Clearly, the plaintiff has an interest in a
compensatory damage award, because that award is designed to remedy
some particular loss. A punitive damage award, as discussed by the court in
Huffman, serves no such function and constitutes a windfall for the
plaintiff.174 Interestingly, while the Colorado court concluded that judgment
creditors have no legitimate interest in a punitive damages award, they
failed to recognize that that same principle, if applied to plaintiffs, would
divest them too.175
Like criminals who serve their sentences to repay a ‘‘debt to society,’’176
judgment creditors of exemplary damage awards are punished for their
egregious or willful misconduct. Such punishment is quasi-criminal,177 and
should be treated like a criminal punishment. In a criminal prosecution, the
victim of a crime does not control the prosecution or direct the outcome of
a case.178 Neither should the victim of a tort-----patent infringement or
otherwise-----beyond his interest in being made whole.
C. Fairness Concerns and the Rules of Equity
Opponents of split-recovery statutes also cite to concerns about the
fairness of split-recovery.179 They argue that the government’s appropriation
of punitive damages-----when the harm giving rise to the award was borne by
173. Id. at 273.
174. Demendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1237 (Or. 2002).
175. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 271.
176. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983) (‘‘[T]he State cannot justify
incarcerating a probationer who has demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his
debt to society . . . .’’).
177. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 286-87 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
punitive damages serve the same purposes as criminal proceedings and that courts should
view punitive damages awards as if they were criminal sanctions); Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 n.1 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Besides the ability to testify in a proceeding and to make a victim impact statement,
victims have little to no ability to influence criminal proceedings, and are afforded no
benefit-----other than the pronouncement of justice-----by a conviction.
179. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., I’ll Take That: Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised
by Statutes That Require Punitive Damages Awards to be Shared with the State, 68 MO. L.
REV. 525 (2003).
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the plaintiff-----constitutes an unfair taking: à la a schoolyard bully at
lunchtime. Further, they argue that punitive damages do serve an important
compensatory purpose for plaintiffs, as plaintiffs often use them to offset
expensive attorney’s fees and litigation costs.180 These arguments are
compelling, but ultimately unable to support a doctrine of
overcompensation.
First, a taking can only be such if it takes what a person rightfully
possesses. While punitive damages have traditionally been given to
plaintiffs in actions, tradition alone does not make a practice legally sound,
as noted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Demendoza.181 But what about
fairness and equity? Are punitive damages not assessed because of egregious
and willful wrongdoing? Is that wrongdoing not directed against the
plaintiff? Does that not entitle plaintiffs, by extension, to all resulting
damages? In short, no. Yes, punitive damages are assessed against egregious
and willful conduct. Yes, the wrongdoing is directed against the plaintiff.
No, this does not mean that plaintiffs should share in damages that are not
intended to make them whole. While plaintiffs are the targets and recipients
of the defendant’s wrongful behavior, they have been fully compensated for
any damage done to them once they receive compensatory damages. To
receive additional remunerations, above and beyond the actual loss, strikes
against traditional notions of entitlement and fairness.
Second, while plaintiffs often put punitive damages to good use in civil
actions-----to pay off attorney’s fees and fees of court, these plaintiffs are not
technically any different from plaintiffs who are not awarded punitive
damages. Both have suffered a wrong. They have both been compensated
for that wrong. To give them preferential treatment, or to treat the punitive
damages as somehow compensatory would create an unfairness as against
the plaintiffs not awarded punitive damages. However beneficial the award
may be to the plaintiff, the award of punitive damages does not make his
one plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees any more deserving of payment than the
ordinary, non-punitive plaintiff.
Some states, like Connecticut, continue to view the primary purpose of
punitive damages as compensation for the plaintiff.182 However, the

180. Id. at 541 (noting that if attorneys are still allowed to receive contingency fees from
punitive damage awards, then the number of punitive damage claims is not likely to
decrease).
181. Demendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1246 (Or. 2002).
182. See, e.g., Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435 (Conn. 1992) (‘‘[P]unitive damages
serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are properly limited to
the plaintiff’s litigation expenses less taxable costs.’’); Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 427 N.W.2d
488, 498-99 (Mich. 1988) (allowing punitive damages for compensation purposes rather than
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majority of courts have summarily rejected this approach. This author urges
that the majority approach should be adopted by the federal system, and by
logical extension should be applied to patent law.
D. Potential for Shifting of Improper Incentive
Lastly, some argue that by shifting punitive damages to benefit the state
instead of the individual, the temptation of tantalizingly large punitive
damage awards will merely shift to the government-----a much more
powerful and dangerous foe.
If split-recovery systems are inappropriately constructed, this concern
might easily be realized. It is not difficult to conceive of an all-powerful,
self-feeding judicial machine that extracts punitive damages from every
defendant to fuel its own coffers. Dystopian science fiction films have been
made from less. However, with proper statutory crafting, this need not be
the case. The majority of states that have enacted split-recovery statutes
have very specifically directed recovered funds away from the judiciary, to
limit any improper judicial incentive in damage awards.183 A recent new
extension to split-recovery schemes is the concept of ‘‘curative damages,’’
which channel the money to a charity rather than a state cause.184 In the
patent context, this could be easily achieved. By amending 35 U.S.C. § 284
to earmark recovered monies for academic or research purposes, the
legislature could easily limit the incentive for a rogue judiciary to act in its
own self-interest.
IV. A CALL FOR PUNITIVE REFORM IN PATENT LAW
The majority of this Comment has been dedicated to the practical and
philosophical advantages of split-recovery in the setting of punitive
damages. What application can this have to punitive damages in the context
of patent law? Why should split-recovery be applied here, instead of
generally in all civil claims? In short, for two reasons: (1) because patent
remedies are tort remedies, and accordingly, can benefit from general tort
reforms, and (2) because the legal foundation for patent claims is unique,
and distinctively suited to a split-recovery paradigm.
for punishment). See also The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1173 (1966) (‘‘When utilized to permit
compensation for otherwise non-compensable losses, the law of punitive damages serves its
historical function of expanding the law of compensatory damages.’’).
183. See discussion supra Part III.B.
184. Brian Bornstein, Should Society get a share of punitive damage awards?, 38 MONITOR
ON PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 10 (2007).
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Legal remedies in patent law are unique in the context of civil claims for
four reasons: (1) patent claims are governed entirely by federal statute, and
are solely in the purview of the federal government; (2) patent protection
arises neither from natural law nor from the American common law; (3)
patent claims-----and the protection of patents in general-----are a social
protection on ideas that are meant to protect the public, not merely the
patent holder; and (4) protecting patents comes at the expense of social
advancement. This author concedes that there is wisdom in limiting the
application of split-recovery. In the unique setting of patent violations,
however, the split-recovery could be applied, with a correspondingly
significant reduction in the concerns against the recovery paradigm.
First, under the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Federal
government is granted exclusive power to grant and enforce patents.185
Changing the patent statute would require the consent of only one
governing body. Moreover, absent constitutional takings concerns,
Congress has the unfettered authority to determine the wisdom of recovery
paradigms in patent cases.
Second, patent claims do not arise out of natural law or common law. In
the common law, there was no such thing as a property right in ideas.186 At
least, there was no right that the government would step in to enforce. The
Constitution and Congress grant this right. Therefore, the people grant the
right. Since the people of the United States uniquely grant this right, the
people should benefit wherever possible from its enforcement.
Third, patent laws are designed to protect ideas from conversion, similar
to the protections for chattel.187 Protecting ideas, like the protection of any
individual’s chattel is a public concern. The primary goal of patent law,
therefore, is not the protection of any individual’s intellectual property, but
rather the protection of society’s interest in intellectual innovation.
Fourth, protecting patents-----unlike protecting other fundamental rights,
such as the right to personal autonomy-----comes at a significant cost. When
one person is allowed to patent an idea, all of society is restricted from
creating objects that fall under the purview of that patent. The free
exchange and proliferation of ideas is stunted, because others cannot ‘‘stand
on the shoulders of giants’’ until the obstacle of patent protection is
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (‘‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.’’).
186. Application of McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (‘‘There being no
common law of patents, we should take care to fill the Holmesian interstices of the statute
with judge-made law only under the gravest and most impelling circumstances.’’).
187. See Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Plasti-Clip Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (D.N.H. 1994).
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removed. And since the people bear the burden of patent protection at the
cost of technological momentum, so too should they receive some benefit
when those protections are enforced.
V. SPLIT-RECOVERY: A RECOMMENDATION
In order to balance the scales of justice and equity in patent claims, this
author suggests that extraordinary damages awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 284
should be modified to follow a split-recovery paradigm. By awarding the
plaintiff with some-----but not all-----of the funds at Congress’s discretion, this
solution properly balances the concerns against overcompensating plaintiffs
with unearned monies, and the concerns of courts and commentators about
the insufficiency of compensatory damages. Here, a portion of the damages
fund will go to ensure against under-compensation, while the remaining
portion will be channeled back into either charitable or non-judicial,
government entities to ensure equity. While this suggestion is conceptually
simple, the application is somewhat more difficult.
A. A Proper Formula for Split-recovery
As discussed above, the specific ratio used in split-recovery systems
varies widely among the states. While the ratio of governmental to private
recovery can be very high or low, this author suggests that extremes are not
a wise method to introduce a new damages paradigm under 35 U.S.C. § 284.
To cover the costs of litigation and allay commentators’ concerns about
inadequate compensatory damages, this author suggests an even recovery
system, with fifty percent of any ‘‘increased damage’’ award given to the
plaintiff in the action, and the other fifty percent placed in trust, to be held
for scientific or charitable purposes. Such a system strikes a balance:
allowing plaintiffs some funds to help cover costs, but limiting the incentive
for future plaintiffs by capping that recovery.
B. A Proper Destination for Recovered Funds
Under a split-recovery system, monies would be recovered from civil
verdicts involving punitive damages. But where should the money go?
Ultimately, the purpose of this Comment is not to argue for any specific
destination for the funds, but rather to suggest that the funds should be sent
somewhere. Accordingly, the following suggestions are just that:
suggestions. Each of these civic organizations are equally distant from the
purse of the judiciary (and thus, equally insulated from judicial abuse), and
are organizations that help contribute to scientific and technological
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advancement in this nation. Each, or all, could be considered by Congress
as a proper destination for recovered funds in punitive damages cases.
One organization to consider is the National Science Foundation
(‘‘NSF’’), an organization created by Congress in 1950 ‘‘to promote the
progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare;
[and] to secure the national defense . . . .’’188 The NSF is dedicated to
scientific advancement and discovery, and each year gives out millions of
dollars in grant money to fund scientific research and technological
studies.189 Funding the NSF would directly aid scientific advancement and
the creation of patentable material-----a worthy destination for funds taken
from willful violators of patent law.
A second organization to consider is the National Institute of Health
(‘‘NIH’’).190 Like the NSF, the NIH directly funds and oversees academic
and scientific study-----including funding 148 Nobel Laureates in the past
century.191 Unlike the NSF, the NIH focuses primarily on the biological
sciences. Though more narrowly focused than the NSF, funding the NIH
would have direct public impact, both in terms of direct social utility and
indirect technological advancement.
Other organizations, such as the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, the National Academy of Sciences, the Fulbright
Academy of Science and Technology, and the American Education
Research Association would all channel recovered funds back into scientific
research and advancement-----benefiting society and creating new patentable
material.
Finally, Congress could create a new fund, specifically dedicated to
funding technological innovation. This way, the monies recovered by the
government will be used directly to fund new research, new innovation, and
new patentable material.
Each of the above would make excellent candidates for money recovered
from a split-recovery statute. However, at the end of the day, Congress may
choose one, all, or none of these options and still realize the benefits of a
split-recovery system. The purpose of this Comment is merely to urge
Congress to enact a split-recovery system in the patent code, as equity and
justice demand.

188. About
the
National
Science
Foundation,
NAT’L
SCI.
FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/about/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
189. Id.
190. History, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/history
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
191. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Patent law has presented, and will continue to present, unique challenges
in the area of damages. The speculative nature of damages in patent claims
leaves much legal footwork for claimants and the judiciary. In recent years,
increased frequency in punitive damage awards, and the constant
enticement of a potential windfall to plaintiffs, have caused growing
concern in the legal community. This Comment has offered the splitrecovery system implemented by a minority of the states for general tort
claims as a possible alternative to the federal statutes governing damages in
patent cases. Specifically, this Comment suggested that punitive damages be
split fifty-fifty between the plaintiffs in patent actions and the state. Proper
application of split-recovery, while a measure that is sure to offend the
plaintiffs’ bar, will best serve the interests of justice and judicial economy in
the federal courts.

